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Abstract:  Mark Richard argues  for  truth-relativism about  claims  made using gradable
adjectives. He argues that truth-relativism is the best explanation of two kinds of linguistic
data, which I call: true cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict. Richard
claims that such data are generated by an example that he discusses at length. However,
the  consensus  is  that  these  linguistic  data  are  illusory  because  they  vanish  when
elaborations are added to examples of the same kind as Richard's original. In this paper I
defend the reality of Richard's data. I show that, in trying to make their point, Richard's
critics have focused upon examples that are similar in some respects to Richard's original
but which lack a crucial feature of that original. When we ensure that this feature is in
place, elaborations which make the data vanish are not possible. Richard's critics therefore
fail to show that the data generated by Richard's original example are illusory.
1. Introduction
Richard  (2004,  2008)  argues  for  truth-relativism  about  claims  made  using  gradable
adjectives i.e. the thesis that the truth of a claim made using a gradable adjective is relative
to  a  context  of  assessment.1 Truth-relativism is  not  just  the  thesis  that  the  truth  of  a
sentence is relative to a context of use. The idea is that a claim or assertion—the utterance
of a sentence in a context of use—can be true relative to one context for assessing the truth
of that claim or assertion and false relative to another. Richard argues that truth-relativism
is the best explanation of two kinds of linguistic data, which I will call true cross-contextual
reports and infelicitous denials of conflict. Although Kennedy (2013) accepts that these data
are  real,  the  consensus  is  that  these  data  are  not  real  (cf.  (Garcia-Carpintero,  2008;
1 I go along with Garcia-Carpintero (2008) and Marques and Garcia-Carpintero (2014) in this interpretation
of  Richard  (2004,  2008).  But  I  doubt  that  this  interpretation  is  correct.  My doubt  arises  for  reasons
acknowledged by Garcia-Carpintero (2008, p. 147). Yet, whatever Richard's intended position actually is,
it's clear what data he uses to defend his position and this paper is about that data.
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Hawthorne, 2004; Marques & Garcia-Carpintero, 2014; Schaffer, 2011; Stanley, 2005)). The
consensus  is  based  on  a  recurring  objection,  which  I  will  call  the  elaboration  objection;
roughly,  when one of the parties to the purported disagreement is allowed 'to explain
himself  better'  (Garcia-Carpintero  2008  p.149)  then  the  data  waver  (ibid)  or  vanish
(Marques & Garcia-Carpintero, 2014, p. 714). In this paper, I defend the reality of these
linguistic  data  against  the  elaboration  objection.  I  argue  that  the  kind  of  explanation
required to make the data vanish cannot be provided in the example Richard originally
used to generate the data. This is true even though it is also true that the explanation can
be used to make the data disappear in the examples discussed by Richard's critics. In other
words, Richard's original example is relevantly different from the examples used by his
critics.  Once  we  recognize  this,  and  once  we  recognize  that  his  example  blocks  the
elaboration objection, we should acknowledge that his data are not shown to be illusory
by the observations of his critics.
I proceed in the following stages. In sections 2 and 3, I describe in greater detail both the
elaboration objection and the data used by Richard to defend truth-relativism. In section 4,
I explain why the elaboration objection cannot be applied to Richard's original example,
even though it  can be applied to the examples discussed by his  critics.  In section 5,  I
explain why Richard's critics have failed to replicate the right features of Richard's original
example:  they  abide  by  Richard's  account  of  why  his  example  generates  the  relevant
linguistic  data  and  hence  of  how  examples  of  the  same  kind  can  be  produced.  But
Richard's account is incorrect. In section 6 I provide an improved account. I show that if
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we produce further examples using this improved account then we will produce further
examples which are not susceptible to the elaboration objection. In section 7, I give some
reason to believe that the data can be generated for a much wider range of expressions
than gradable adjectives. In section 8, I contrast the account of section 6 with another (put
forward by Barker (2013)  and Kennedy (2013)) with which it might, but should not, be
confused.
Before we begin, I hasten to add that none of this is intended to show that truth-relativism
is true. It's possible that alternative accounts of the relevant data are available. After all,
although Marques and Garcia-Carpintero (2014) do not believe that Richard's data are real,
they do think that such data can be generated with other expressions (viz. predicates of
personal taste). They nonetheless think that a non-truth-relativist account of that data is
superior. I see no reason why such an account could not be provided for Richard's data as
well. This paper is about the reality of the data and not about what it implies.
2. True cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict
Gradable  adjectives  are  adjectives  which  admit  intensifiers  (e.g.  “very”,  “really”)  and
sometimes maximizers (e.g.  “completely”, “totally”).  Richard (2004, p.  218)  reminds us
that gradable adjectives are widely thought to be context sensitive. What is tall for a Brit is
not tall for a Dane and what is rich for a philosophy professor is not rich for an oil tycoon.
It seems that for a gradable adjective “F”, what is F depends upon a contextually supplied
comparison class (e.g. Brits, Danes, philosophy professors or oil tycoons). One can account
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for this by identifying the semantic value of a gradable adjective with a function from
objects to truth values such that an object maps to true just in case it passes a threshold on
a scale, where the scale depends on the adjective in question (e.g. height, wealth etc.) and
the threshold is (something like) the average of a contextually supplied comparison class
(e.g. the average height of a Brit).2 I presume this account in what follows. There are, of
course, other accounts of the semantic value of gradable adjectives that explain a greater
range of data.  But the observations and arguments of this paper are unaffected by the
choice of account that we presume, provided that the account we presume at least explains
the data described in this paragraph. With this in mind, Richard asks us to consider the
following two assertions:
(1) (Didi in her context C1): Mary's rich.
(2) (Naomi in her context C2): Mary is not rich at all.
Richard tells us the following about C1 and C2:
Suppose,  to  take  an  example,  that  Mary  wins  a  million  dollar  lottery.  Didi  is  
impressed, and remarks to a friend 'Mary's rich.' Naomi, for whom a million dollars
is not really all that much, remarks in a conversation disjoint from Didi's, 'Mary is 
2 Most analyses of gradable adjectives do not attribute this semantic value directly to the adjective. Rather,
the adjective is assigned a function from objects to degrees which combines with degree morphology to
produce something like the semantic value described above. The positive form of an adjective (which
does  not  combine  with  any  explicit  degree  morphology)  combines  with  an  aphonic  morpheme  to
produce something like  the semantic  value described above.  See,  for  example,  (Cresswell,  1977)  and
(Kennedy, 1999).
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not rich at all'. Suppose the salient comparison class is the same in both cases. (Both 
are taking New Yorkers to be the relevant field of comparison.) Suppose that there 
is no difference between the two conversations in the point of assessing people as 
rich or otherwise. (Each conversation began with the observation that some wealthy
person doesn't deserve to be rich, and each of the women is now idly assessing  
people as rich or otherwise, and then assessing whether the rich ones deserve their 
wealth.) (Richard, 2004, p. 218)
Richard supposes—as will we—that 'Mary is rich' is true when assessed relative to the
standards operative in C1 and that 'Mary is not rich at all' is true when assessed relative to
the standards operative in C2. He also makes two claims about (1) and (2). Firstly, he (ibid)
claims that 'It seems to most of us that Naomi is contradicting Didi.' Following Garcia-
Carpintero (2008, p. 145), I will interpret this claim as meaning that denials of conflict by
either Didi or Naomi are infelicitous; i.e. using “?” to indicate infelicity:
(3) (Didi, in C2, responding to Naomi's assertion): (?) That does not contradict what I
said.3
Secondly, Richard claims that cross-contextual (disagreement) reports are true as applied
to (1) and (2). For example:
3 Garcia-Carpintero also considers felicitous retractions. I set them aside for ease of exposition but I assume
that what's said here for infelicitous denials of conflict also applies to felicitous retractions.
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(4) (Richard in his third context): Didi and Naomi disagree. Didi thinks that Mary is
rich but Naomi does not.
It  is  in order to  account  for the infelicity of  denials  of  conflict  and the truth of  cross-
contextual reports, as made of (1) and (2), that Richard endorses truth-relativism. If an
assertion can be true relative to one context of assessment and false relative to another
then despite the difference in the truth value of 'Mary is rich' in C1 and C2, firstly, the
content  Didi  expresses  can be inconsistent  with the content  expressed by  Naomi,  and
secondly, Richard can make a true cross-contextual report about Didi and Naomi in his
context.
3. The elaboration objection
Recall  that  the  elaboration  objection  is  roughly  this:  when  one  of  the  parties  to  the
purported disagreement is allowed to explain himself better then the relevant linguistic
data vanish. Several philosophers have raised this objection but, for the moment, we will
focus  on  Garcia-Carpintero  (2008).  Although  he  is  targeting  Richard's  data,  Garcia-
Carpintero  does  not  level  the  elaboration  objection  against  the  particular  example
discussed by Richard i.e. (1) and (2). He focuses instead on what he evidently considers to
be an example of the same kind:
(5) (A,  assuming  Bill  is  1.96m  tall,  informally  discussing  the  height  of  basketball
players): Bill is short.
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(6) (B, assuming Bill is 1.96m tall, discussing the height of basketball players with
basketball coaches, after concluding from careful study that players shorter than
1.9587 are not ideal for the game): Bill is not short.
Even though 'Bill is short' is true in A's context and 'Bill is not short' in B's context (we may
suppose), the assertions seem to allow for an infelicitous denial of conflict and a true cross-
contextual report:
(7) (A, in B's context, responding to B's assertion): (?) That does not contradict what I
said.
(8) (C, in some third context): A and B disagree. A thinks that Bill is short but B does
not.
However, if we elaborate in the following ways then these appearances disappear:
(9) (A in B's context, responding to B's assertion): That does not contradict what I said.
I was just saying that Bill is short for a basketball player on rough estimates for the 
purposes of coffee talk; we were not contemplating your levels of precision; thus I  
was not wrong.
(10) (D, in context C3, responding to C's cross-contextual report): That's not true. A was
saying Bill is short for a basketball player on rough estimates for the purposes of 
coffee  talk  but  B  was  saying  Bill  is  not  short  for  a  basketball  player  for  the  
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purposes of talking with basketball coaches, after concluding from careful study 
that players shorter than 1.9587 are not ideal for the game.
Less roughly then, the elaboration objection is as follows. Suppose that “F” is a gradable
adjective and “O” is a name that has a context-insensitive referent.  Now consider two
utterances made in different contexts: one utterance of “O is F” and the other of “O is not
F.” Suppose that each utterance is true when assessed relative to the standards operative in
its own context. Suppose that “F” has the same contextually specified comparison class in
each context. The elaboration objection is this: although the appearances of an infelicitous
denial  of  conflict  and  a  true  cross-contextual  report  can  be  generated  for  these  two
utterances, those appearances vanish when the report and the denial are elaborated upon
in  the  ways  exemplified  in  (9)  and  (10)  i.e.  by  drawing  attention  to  a  divergence  of
purposes across the two contexts. The appearances are therefore mere appearances and so
cannot constitute evidence for a semantic theory.
4. We cannot apply the elaboration objection to Richard's example
Garcia-Carpintero's  chosen  example  strongly  resembles  Richard's  original.  However,
although we can apply the elaboration objection to Garcia-Carpintero's example, if we take
careful note of how Richard describes the two contexts of his example—C1 and C2—we
will  find  that  we  cannot  apply  the  elaboration  objection  to  Richard's  original.  For  in
Richard's original, the contexts C1 and C2 do not differ in the purposes pursued: Richard
stipulates that they are the same. See again the extended quotation from Richard in section
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2. In particular, this part: 
Suppose that there is no difference between the two conversations in the point of 
assessing  people  as  rich  or  otherwise.  (Each  conversation  began  with  the  
observation that some wealthy person doesn't deserve to be rich, and each of the 
women is  now idly  assessing  people  as  rich  or  otherwise,  and  then  assessing  
whether the rich ones deserve their wealth.) (Richard, 2004, p. 218)
But in order to formulate elaborations in the ways exemplified in (9) and (10), we need a
divergence of purposes across the contexts.
Perhaps, rather than drawing attention to divergent purposes, we could focus on the mere
fact  that  Naomi  and  Didi  clearly  view  wealth  in  different  ways:  even  for  a  fixed
comparison class, they place the threshold of wealth that one must surpass in order to be
rich at different points on the scale of wealth. This could be a relevant difference between
the  two  contexts—in  fact,  this  seems  to  be  the  only  difference  in  Richard's  example.
Perhaps, simply on account of this, the intuitive truth of (4) can be made to disappear and
the intuitive infelicity of (3) also. But this would be surprising. It's hardly a revelation that
Naomi and Didi differ in this respect. Richard is explicit about the difference. So if the
difference sufficed to undermine the report's truth and the denial's infelicity, it would be
strange that Richard's paper was ever published—reviewers would surely have denied the
reality of Richard's data. Consider the following:
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(11) (Didi  in Naomi's  context,  responding to Naomi's  assertion):  (?)  That does not  
contradict what I said. I was just saying that Mary is rich in the sense that she's got
a lot more disposable income than most people in the world have; we were not  
contemplating your standards of wealth; thus I was not wrong.
(12) (Me,  in Richard's  context,  responding to Richard's  cross-contextual  report):  (?)  
That's not true. Didi was saying that Mary is rich in the sense that she's got a lot 
more disposable income than most people in the world but Naomi was saying that
Mary is not rich in the sense that she's not got as much disposable income as  
Naomi has.
Insofar as what gives rise to the conflict between Didi and Naomi is that they disagree
about where to place the threshold one must surpass in order to qualify as rich on a scale
of wealth, attempts to draw attention to this can only sound like restatements of Didi and
Naomi's  disagreement  rather  than  a  means  to  show  that  the  disagreement  is  merely
verbal.  Surely, at  one time or another,  each of  us has been engaged in a dispute with
someone only to have a well-meaning third-party try to reveal the dispute to be baseless
by drawing attention to a divergence in the use of a term by the parties to the dispute, and
yet,  the  attempt  falls  flat  because  it  merely  reveals  that  the  third-party  doesn't  really
understand the depth of the disagreement. Given Richard's description of C1 and C2, this
is how we should think of (11) and (12), and if we do then (11) and (12) will strike us as
infelicitous: they seem to betray a misunderstanding by, in the one case, Didi and, in the
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other, me. Certainly, sometimes pointing out a divergence in the use of an expression by
two parties who seem to disagree can thwart the impression that they disagree. But not
always and not in Richard's original example.
This same problem for the elaboration objection arises for all other attempts to apply it:
whereas Richard's original example involved a stipulation that there is no divergence of
purpose across the two contexts, when critics try to show that the relevant kind of cross-
contextual  disagreement is  illusory,  they describe contexts  either for which there is  no
stipulation of common purpose or for which there is a stipulation of divergent purposes
(cf.  (Hawthorne, 2004, p. 104; Marques & Garcia-Carpintero, 2014, pp. 712–714; Schaffer,
2011, p. 213; Stanley, 2005, pp. 55–56).
5. Richard's mistaken account
Why would critics of truth-relativism target examples that are significantly different from
the  one  actually  employed  by  Richard?  That's  easily  explained.  Richard  proposes  an
account  of  how to  build examples of  the same kind as his  original.  He (2004,  p.  229)
proposes that in the semantic value of a gradable adjective, it's not just the comparison
class which is context-sensitive. He proposes that even once the comparison class has been
fixed, the precise threshold for that comparison class is still  to be settled by contextual
factors: you don't fix one by fixing the other. Moreover, he (ibid, pp.229-230) proposes that
whereas the comparison class is fixed solely by the speaker's intention, the threshold can
be  “negotiated”  in  context.  It  can  be  modified  by  providing,  'examples,  argument,
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mutually agreeable stipulation, and so on.' (Richard, 2004, p. 227). On Richard's account, it
is because the threshold can be negotiated in context that we can generate a true cross-
contextual  report  and  an  infelicitous  denial  of  conflict  for  his  example.  This  account
implies that any gradable adjective, regardless of the contexts in which it is employed,
should give rise to true cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict. This, it
seems, is why Garcia-Carpintero and company have supposed it acceptable to criticize
Richard (or at least, a truth-relativist who motivates her position by appealing to truth
cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict) by using examples that differ
from Richard's original but which nonetheless include a gradable adjective used in two
contexts with the same comparison class. They think such examples are of the same kind
as  Richard's  original.  In  working  with  such  examples,  these  critics  demonstrate  that,
insofar  as  Richard has  an example that  gives rise  to  true cross-contextual  reports  and
infelicitous  denials  of  conflict,  it  doesn't  give rise  to  these phenomena for  the reasons
Richard thinks it does. But they do not show that Richard's example does not give rise to
these data.
6. An alternative account: permissive contexts
If Richard's account doesn't correctly explain how we can produce more examples like his
original, is there a better alternative account that does? Let's see. Here's what we know
about Richard's original example. Firstly, we know that the purposes of the interlocutors in
each context (C1 and C2) are stipulated to be the same. Secondly, we know that those
purposes  have  been  stipulated  to  be  idle;  i.e.  in  each  context  there  are  no  linguistic,
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instrumental or moral reasons for using “rich” with a certain threshold of wealth that one
must surpass to qualify as rich. This means, the tools of contextual negotiation listed by
Richard  ('examples,  argument,  mutually  agreeable  stipulation,  and  so  on')  cannot  be
marshalled to show that one way of using “rich” is the correct one for either context—any
argument about that is doomed to have no resolution. Thirdly, although no factor in either
context makes it the case that occupants of the context ought to use the expression one
way  or  another,  the  occupants  in  the  different  contexts  nonetheless  have  different
preferences for how to use the gradable adjective.
In  light  of  what  we  know,  here's  an  alternative  account  of  the  operative  features  of
Richard's  example.  In  a given context,  there are various  normative factors  which bear
upon whether one should use an expression in a particular way in that context.  These
factors might be linguistic: e.g. its part of the meaning of “rich” in English that you cannot
use  it  to  be  mean the  same as  “swan.”  These  factors  might  be  instrumental:  e.g.  if  a
photographer gives you instructions for finding green leafs to be used as props in a colour
photography project  then,  ceteris  paribus,  you should use “green” so that something is
green only if it is visibly green on its surface (rather than green underneath a coat of red
paint) (c.f. (Travis, 2008)). These factors might be moral: e.g. it might be incorrect to apply
the word “man” to a person who honestly self-identifies as a woman if it is morally wrong
to do so (cf. (Saul, 2012) and (Diaz-Leon, forthcoming)). But it's possible that, in a given
context, the sum of factors that bear upon how an expression ought to be employed in that
context does not require that occupants of that context use the expression in one of several
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different ways. I will call such contexts permissive. In Richard's original example, we find
two contexts which are such that, firstly, both are permissive with respect to the threshold
of wealth for “rich” when used with a comparison class of New Yorkers and, secondly,
occupants of the contexts nonetheless have different preferences with respect to how to set
this threshold. An alternative account of the operative features of Richard's example is that
the operative features are the two features just listed: the two contexts are both permissive
with respect to the threshold for being rich and participants in each context have diverging
preferences with respect to this threshold. On this account, Richard's example is a special
case of a very familiar kind of situation. The multifarious normative factors that bear upon
what one should do in a given situation just don't tip the balance in favour of one of
several options. So one can exercise one's preferences in choosing between those options
without violating any normative principle governing what one ought to do.
If this account is correct then we should be able to use it to generate further examples like
Richard's original that are not susceptible to elaboration objections. This does indeed seem
to be possible. Suppose that two teenage girls, Sue and Tina, are in different contexts (C3
and C4) and in each context each is idly assessing whether or not Tina's boyfriend is short.
Let's suppose that the comparison class in both cases is the set of American teenage boys.
This leaves open a host of matters which bear upon who is an American boy and what
their heights are: which are the true Americans; which boys are really better thought of as
men (on account of emotional maturity or puberty or something else?); and so on. Sue and
Tina take different views on how these matters bear upon the threshold for being short for
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an American teenage boy. But, let's suppose, nothing—no linguistic, instrumental or moral
factor—in either C3 or C4 rationally requires them to take one view on this matter over
another. Now consider the following two assertions:
(13) (Sue in C3): Tina's boyfriend is short.
(14) (Tina in C4): My boyfriend is not short.
It seems that a denial of conflict by Sue, directed against (14), would be infelicitous and
that a true cross-contextual report can be made of (13) and (14):
(15) (Sue, in C3, responding to Tina's assertion): (?) That does not contradict what I  
said.
(16) (Richard  in  his  third  context):  Sue  and  Tina  disagree.  Sue  thinks  that  Tina's  
boyfriend is short but Tina doesn't think that he's short
However, as with Richard's original example, elaborations which appeal to a divergence of
purpose in C3 and C4 cannot be used to show (15) and (16) to be illusory data because
there simply is no divergence of purpose between C3 and C4 that can be cited to do the
job. Moreover, modified elaborations which seize upon the difference in how Sue and Tina
think of being short for an American teenage boy will only amount to restatements of the
disagreement: they will not reveal it to be merely verbal.
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The  example  discussed  by  Garcia-Carpintero  (viz.  (5)  and  (6))  does  not  include  two
permissive contexts. Each of the two contexts he discusses includes factors (purposes) that
rationally require occupants of the respective contexts  to  use “short” with a particular
threshold. It's by stating these purposes that Garcia-Carpintero creates the impression that
“short”  is  being  used differently  in  each context  (compare  this  with the  way Richard
achieves the same effect in the extended quotation in section 2). Similar things can be said
for  the  other  examples  against  which  the  elaboration  objection  has  been  levelled  by
Hawthorne, Marques and Garcia-Carpintero, Schaffer, and Stanley: either divergent, non-
permissive purposes  are stipulated or else  no single idle  purpose is  stipulated.  In  the
former case, elaboration objections are not blocked by permissive contexts because there
aren't any. In the latter case, elaboration objections are not blocked by permissive contexts
because,  without  stipulations  that  make  clear  the  permissiveness  of  the  contexts,  it's
possible to presuppose a non-permissive context in the formulation of the elaboration and
thereby make the elaboration felicitous. This is so even though one wouldn't be able to do
this if it had already been made explicit  that the contexts are permissive. For instance,
consider the following example from Schaffer (2011, p. 213):
(17) Ann: Licorice is tasty.
(18) Ben: No, licorice is not tasty.
(19) Ann: Listen, I was just saying that I like it.
(19) could be an elaboration on a denial of conflict between (17) and (18). As such, (19) is
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perfectly legitimate for all that we have been told about what Ann's purposes were in (17).
In fact, (19) seems to provide us with information about what Ann's purposes were in (17).
However,  if  it  had already been clear what Ann's purposes were in (17),  and if  it  had
already been clear that she was not just trying to say that she liked licorice but instead had
(in  the  sense  described  above)  a  mere  idle  purpose,  then  (19)  would  be  problematic.
Suppose,  for  example,  that  Ann  and  Ben  commonly  get  into  a  playful  (but  honest)
argument about whether licorice is tasty which neither of them ever wins but which is fun
to have anyway. Suppose it was obvious when Ann uttered (17) that she was instigating
this kind of exchange. However, because someone walks past that makes her embarrassed
to engage in that kind of exchange (e.g. her boss), she utters (19) to pretend as though she
is far too mature to engage in such a childish conversation. If this were all apparent to Ben,
he could object  to (19)  qua  denial of conflict.  When she uttered (17),  Ann was  not just
saying that she likes licorice; not if that is supposed to mean that Ben has misunderstood
her purposes in uttering (17) and hence spoke with her at cross purposes when he uttered
(18). Thus, if the context of (17) were explicitly permissive, the elaborated denial of conflict
in (19) could not be made felicitously.
Such is the importance of being explicit about permissive contexts. Whether they stipulate
non-permissive contexts,  or  fail  to  stipulate  permissive contexts,  because the examples
provided by Richard's critics differ in this respect from Richard's original, they cannot be
used to show that the intuitions produced in Richard's original are illusory.4
4 Notably, the example which Marques and Garcia-Carpintero (2014, p. 701) think does give rise to true
cross-contextual reports is an example in which it has been stipulated that the context is permissive.
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7. Other expressions: e.g. comparative adjectives
It  seems that  contexts  which are  permissive with respect  to  the threshold  for  being F
(where “F” is a gradable adjective, used with a particular comparison class) allow true
cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict. Do we get the same effect with
contexts that are permissive with respect to other context-sensitive features of linguistic
expressions? I  think we do.  Let's  consider the comparative adjective “taller than.” The
thing about comparative adjectives is that if we can show that an assertion made using “A
is F-er than B” and an assertion made using “A is not F-er than B” can give rise to true
cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict (even though each sentence is
true relative to  the standards operative in its  own context  of  use)  then this  cannot be
explained by appeal to indeterminacy or vagueness in the threshold for being F—contrary
to what Richard (2004, pp. 226-227) seems to suggest. This is because the location of that
threshold doesn't affect the relative positions of A and B on the relevant scale but it is their
relative  positions  that  matter  for  the  truth  of  claims  like  “A is  F-er  than  B.”  This  is
presumably  why,  although  Kennedy  (2013,  p.  275)  accepts  what  Richard  says  about
gradable adjectives, he does not think that the same phenomena can arise for comparative
adjectives.5 However, as we'll now see, the phenomena can arise for comparative adjectives
when  we  replicate  the  relevant  features  of  Richard's  original  example.  Consider  the
following:
5 Kennedy  denies  that  comparative  adjectives  allow  faultless  disagreement  when  those  comparative
adjectives have a dimensional—rather than an evaluative—reading. The example discussed in this section
clearly involves the use of a comparative adjective with a dimensional reading.
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Height Banter
During the course of  a day,  in some sense,  your height  changes.  This  happens  
because the spinal discs between your vertebrae are largely made of water. When 
you place weight on the disks in your back (as when you are standing or sitting  
upright), they compress (over the course of several hours). But when you're lying 
down, they expand. Ana, Bea, Cat and Dee are four competitive girls. They compete
over everything: who can fit the most gob-stoppers in her mouth, who can jump the
furthest etc. Suppose that Ana recently broke a leg and for this reason spends most 
of  each  day  lying  down.  When  they  stand  against  a  wall,  Ana's  height  is  a  
centimetre or so higher than Cat's. Suppose that if Ana and Cat had been lying  
down all day, then Cat would be taller than Ana. Being competitive girls, each girl 
wants to be taller than the other.  For that reason, Cat adopts the view that the  
proper way to compare two persons' heights is to ensure that they have both been 
lying down for  the same amount of  time prior  to  measurement.  For  the same  
reason, Ana adopts the view that the proper way to compare two persons' heights is
to stand them against a wall and measure their heights—regardless of whether one 
of them has been lying down recently. Finally, suppose that Bea is a friend of Ana's 
who agrees with Ana about the proper way to measure relative height and Dee is a 
friend of  Cat's  who agrees  with Cat about  the proper way to measure relative  
heights. Now, suppose that in one context, Ana and Cat are talking about whether 
Ana or Cat  is taller, and in another context, Bea and Dee are talking about whether 
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Ana or Cat is taller. In each context, there's nothing but banter going on: these are 
permissive contexts. Nothing in either context settles how relative height is to be  
understood in that context. In the first context, Ana says, “I am taller than you,” and
in the second context, Dee says, “Ana is not taller than Cat.”
Just as in Richard's original “rich” example, an attempted denial of conflict by Ana would
be infelicitous:
(20) (Ana in Dee's context, responding to Dee's assertion): (?) That doesn't contradict 
what I said.
Similarly, Richard can make a true cross-contextual report by saying:
(21) (Richard, in some third context): Ana and Dee disagree. Ana thinks that she is  
taller than Cat but Dee thinks she isn't.
Moreover, for now familiar reasons, elaborations won't change this: there are no divergent
purposes that can be appealed to which require use of “taller than” in a particular way in
either  Ana or  Dee's  context  and hence  which  could  be  used  to  formulate  elaboration
objections against (20) and (21).
This  gives us reason to believe that the linguistic  data generated by Richard's  original
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example  are  not  dependent  upon  vagueness:  i.e.  indeterminacy  in  exactly  where  the
threshold  on  the  scale  of  a  gradable  adjective  lies.  The  comparison  class  for  the
comparative  adjective  or  some  other  contextual  feature  of  the  adjective  must  be
responsible for the data generated by Height Banter. But if (contra Richard) vagueness is
not a precondition for generating the relevant data then there's reason to believe that a
range of context-sensitive expressions (when used in the right contexts) could give rise to
true  cross-contextual  reports  and  infelicitous  denials  of  conflict—a range  that  extends
beyond gradable adjectives. I am not sure how wide this range will be. It certainly doesn't
seem to encompass indexicals and demonstratives (consider analogues of  (1) and (2) with
the sentence 'Mary is her'). But it seems that it could encompass prepositional phrases (e.g.
“on the rug”), possessives (e.g. “John's book”), certain verbs (e.g. “harm”), quantifiers (e.g.
“everyone”),  some count  nouns  (e.g.  “portion”),  some mass  nouns  (e.g.  “water”)  and
perhaps others. For each of these expressions, we can find ways to draw distinctions that
would imply differences in the extensions of such expressions. For example,  we could
distinguish between a conception of “on the rug” according to which meat wrapped in a
sealed plastic bag on top of a rug is meat “on the rug” and a conception of “on the rug”
according to which it is not. If employed in appropriately permissive contexts, it seems
very likely that true cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict will be
forthcoming for assertions made using such expressions, where even though one assertion
is  made  using  a  sentence  and  the  other  is  made  using  that  sentence's  negation,  each
sentence is true relative to its own context of use. To show this convincingly we would
have to consider the evidence that bears on the behaviour of each expression. Nonetheless,
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from our current standpoint we can certainly see how we could go about generating that
evidence  given  our  alternative  account  of  the  operative  features  of  Richard's  original
example.
8. Uncertainty
Barker (2013) and Kennedy (2013) propose a common explanation of why an assertion of a
sentence (that employs a vague predicate) and an assertion of that sentence's negation can
generate an appearance of disagreement between the two asserters even though neither
asserter is at fault in asserting what she does. I am concerned that this explanation might
appear to be a version of the account that I have provided of why Richard's original (1)
and (2) give rise to true cross-contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict. So in
this closing section I will explain why this appearance is mere appearance: Barker and
Kennedy's  explanation  is  not  a  version  of  the  account  put  forward  in  this  paper.  By
contrasting Barker and Kennedy's ideas with my own, I hope to make more obvious some
of the features of my account of the data discussed in this paper.
Barker (2013, pp. 247-249) and Kennedy (2013, p. 274) put forward what I will call  the
uncertainty account  of faultless disagreement.6 According to the uncertainty account, the
value of a context-sensitive parameter of a vague predicate in context is what it is because
speakers agree that it has a particular value in that context: for Barker the parameter is the
6 I call this “the uncertainty account” because Barker and Kennedy speak as follows: they say that if two
equally  competent  speakers  diverge in  their  views about  the  value  of  a  contextual  parameter  of  an
expression in context then there is “uncertainty” about the value.
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threshold of the predicate, for Kennedy the parameter is the dimension of evaluation of
the predicate. On this account, all speakers are equal in their authority to determine the
proper  value  of  the  relevant  parameter  in  context.7 So  if  speakers  diverge  in  their
judgements about the correct  value of the parameter in a context then there just  is  no
unique correct value of the parameter in the context. So if one speaker asserts a sentence
and the other speaker asserts its negation but that sentence includes a vague predicate
with such a parameter, then the speakers can qualify as disagreeing without either being
at fault (i.e. each can have said something true relative to her own value for the contextual
parameter and neither need be mistaken in adopting the value she does).
The uncertainty account might be understood as describing a way in which a permissive
context can be produced: permissive contexts are generated when two speakers disagree
about  the  correct  value  of  a  particular  kind of  context-sensitive  parameter  of  a  vague
predicate in context. If the uncertainty account is thus understood then the uncertainty
account will appear to be a version of the idea that permissive contexts generate the data
that have concerned us in this paper—albeit a version that is limited in scope to vague
predicates. But for two reasons, the uncertainty account should not be understood as a
version of the account put forward in this paper.
Firstly, the uncertainty account requires us to be constructivists about the norms governing
7 I think this assumption is incorrect. I strongly suspect that there is often (perhaps normally) an interesting
politics  to the settling of context-sensitive  content  in context.  For  example,  see Davies'  (forthcoming)
study of one way in which a cross-examiner can control the contents of context-sensitive terms employed
by a cross-examined witness.
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the correct value of a context-sensitive parameter of an expression in context (something
Barker (2013, p. 250) explicitly acknowledges). It requires us to suppose that the norms are
constituted by agreement between different users of the expression (in context). Insofar as
there is no agreement, no norm dictates with which parameter value the expression ought
to be employed in context. But nothing about my appeal to permissive contexts requires
constructivism. Whether norms constrain the correct way to use an expression in a context
to  such  an  extent  that  there  cannot  be  divergent  faultless  assignments  of  values  to  a
context-sensitive parameter in the context is a matter that is, it seems, separate from the
matter of what constitutes the norms. It is consistent with the proposed account of true
cross-contextual  reports  and  infelicitous  denials  of  conflict  that  two  interlocutors  can
diverge  in  their  judgements  about  the  correct  value  to  assign  to  a  context-sensitive
parameter  of  an  expression  in  context  and  both of  them  be  at  fault.8 The  fact  of
disagreement does not, on this view, protect them from being at fault. What matters is not
whether  they  disagree  about  a  special  component  of  the  semantic  value  of  a  given
expression but instead whether the total context of use includes normative factors that
make a particular value of the contextual parameter the correct value in that context. In
this respect, the two accounts diverge.9
8 I say that this is consistent with the account, rather than that the account entails it, because the relevant
norms might be constructivist. This would close the gap between the two accounts.
9 Barker (2013, p. 249) acknowledges one exception to this constructivism: he provides evidence that a
speaker must be consistent in her use of a vague predicate during the same discourse and that this can
undermine the appearance of faultless disagreement. Nonetheless, he does not acknowledge either the
role played by normative contextual factors (as opposed to previous uses of the same vague predicate), or
the role of  contemporaneous context  (as opposed to prior  discourse)  in  fixing the correct  value of a
contextual parameter.
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Secondly, the uncertainty account repeats a mistake made by Richard. Richard claims that
his  original  example generates  true cross-contextual  reports  and infelicitous  denials  of
conflict because the example included a kind of expression (a vague predicate) which has a
context-sensitive parameter that is subject to “negotiation” (see section 5). So, regardless of
what  else  might  be  going  on  in  the  context(s)  of  use,  we can replicate  those  data  by
producing an example in which the same kind of expression is employed with a context-
sensitive parameter that is subject to negotiation. It's because Richard's explanation of his
data is insensitive to what more is going on in the context(s) of use that opponents have
raised the elaboration objection against him: elaborations show that the data disappear
when further features of  the context are suitably  modified.  The uncertainty account is
similarly insensitive to the wider context of use. It says that an asserter of a sentence and
an asserter of  that  sentence's  negation can disagree and be faultless  in their  assertions
whenever the sentence includes a vague predicate and there is no consensus between the
two  asserters  about  the  threshold  (for  Barker)  or  the  dimension  of  evaluation  (for
Kennedy) of the predicate (albeit with the exception noted in footnote 9). However, given
firstly  that,  in  order  to  sustain  an  appearance  of  faultless  disagreement,  true  cross
contextual reports and infelicitous denials of conflict should be elicitable despite the sense
that  neither  asserter  is  at  fault,  and  given  secondly  that  such  data  can  be  made  to
disappear with elaborations like those used against Richard unless it has been explicitly
stipulated that the contexts of use are permissive, and given thirdly, that the uncertainty
account provides no such stipulation, it follows that the elaboration objection will apply as
much to Barker and Kennedy as it  does to Richard.  But the account of Richard's data
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described in this paper is not susceptible to the elaboration objection. This constitutes a
second respect in which the uncertainty account of faultless disagreement diverges from
the account of Richard's data put forward in this paper. The former is not a version of the
latter.10
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